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ABSTRACT
Mainstream economic theory outlines four main causes
of market failure and it is already well established that
two of these (information failure and externalities) exist
in a tobacco market. A third cause of market failure,
market power, is also a serious problem in many tobacco
markets. Market powerdcombined with unintended and
often overlooked consequences of tobacco tax policies,
notably that gradual increases in speciﬁc taxes may
allow the industry to disguise signiﬁcant price
increasesdhas, at least in high income countries, given
cigarette manufacturers considerable pricing power and
proﬁts. This paper examines ways this market failure
could be addressed and proposes as a solution a system
of price cap regulation wherein a cap is placed on the
pre-tax cigarette manufacturers’ price but not on the
retail price that consumers face. Well established in the
utilities industry, price cap regulation would set
a maximum price that cigarette companies can charge
for their product based on an assessment of the genuine
costs each ﬁrm faces in its operations and an
assumption about the efﬁciency savings it would be
expected to make. Such a system would achieve three
main beneﬁts. First, it would address the problem of
market failure and excess proﬁts while simultaneously
allowing current tobacco control policies, including tax
and price increases, to expanddthus tax increases
would remain a central tenet of tobacco control policies
and retail prices could continue to increase. Second, it
would increase government revenue by transferring the
excess proﬁts from the industry to the government
purse. Third, it would bring numerous public health
beneﬁts. In addition to addressing market power, while
simultaneously allowing tobacco control policies to
expand, it could offer a means of preventing down-
trading to cheaper products and controlling unwanted
industry practices such as cigarette smuggling, price
ﬁxing and marketing to the young. The paper outlines in
some detail how such a system might be developed in
the UK, while brieﬂy exploring how it could be applied
elsewhere, including in markets with state monopolies.
INTRODUCTION
This paper makes a radical proposal for the regu-
lation of tobacco markets which are over-
whelmingly dominated by cigarettes. It shows how
market failure, in the form of market power,
combined with well intentioned and necessary
tobacco control policies, including taxation and
marketing restrictions, have had the unintended
consequence of giving cigarette manufacturers
considerable pricing power and proﬁts. In so doing,
it outlines an overlooked issue in tobacco control:
gradual increases in speciﬁc taxes beneﬁt cigarette
manufacturers by enabling them to increase prices
and thus proﬁts, an issue which explains why
industry proﬁts continue to increase despite falling
cigarette sales. It then explores ways of addressing
this problem, proposing as a solution a system of
price cap regulation which, by capping cigarette
manufacturers’ prices but not the price that
consumers face at retail outlets, would allow
governments to maintain and expand their tobacco
control policies while mitigating their unintended
consequences. In other words, this proposal would
allow tax increases to remain a central tenet of
tobacco control policy, but would do so while
simultaneously preventing the high manufacturer
proﬁts and market distortions.
To explore how this might work in practice this
paper uses the UK as an example, outlining how
such an approach would not only address market
failure and capture the rent currently accruing to
the tobacco industry for the public purse, but also
bring numerous public health advantages. Finally,
the paper suggests that such a system could be
applied to most markets, including those with state
monopolies, by adapting it as necessary to the
national context.
PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT TOBACCO
MARKET AND THE TOBACCO PRICING SYSTEM
Market failure
Mainstream economic theory outlines four main
causes of market failure: information failure or
asymmetry, externalities such as the external costs
imposed on others through the manufacture and
use of tobacco, the provision of public goods and
market power.
1 That two of these (information
failure and externalities) exist in a tobacco market
has already been clearly outlined
2 and is not dwelt
on further here. Instead, we outline how market
power also exists.
The number of major tobacco transnationals has
been declining following numerous mergers and
acquisitions such that there are now only four
dominating the global tobacco market outside
China: Philip Morris International, British American
Tobacco, Japan Tobacco International and Imperial
Tobacco.
3 Consequently, the cigarette trade is
dominated in virtually all major markets by
a very small, and declining, number of cigarette
manufacturing companies (table 1). In 2008, for
example, notwithstanding the publicly owned
Chinese National Tobacco Company which has
a 98% share of the Chinese market, the leading
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Special communicationcompany in each of the world’s largest cigarette markets had
a market share of between 28% and 86% (table 1). The most
striking indication of the highly concentrated nature of cigarette
sales is the three-ﬁrm concentration ratiodthe total market
share in each country accounted for by the three companies
with the largest market share. With the exception of Indonesia,
in all the major markets just three ﬁrms control at least 80% of
the market, and in many markets the top three ﬁrms account for
more than 90% (table 1). To put such ﬁgures into perspective,
the UK Competition Commission investigates mergers between
companies that would result in ﬁrms gaining more than 25%
market share or less where it appears likely there would be
a substantial lessening of competition.
4
This highly concentrated nature of cigarette markets is exac-
erbated by the signiﬁcant underlying barriers to market entry by
new cigarette manufacturers which have inadvertently been
ampliﬁed by tobacco control measures, notably bans on adver-
tising and promotion.
5 These measures are essential and effec-
tive components of tobacco control strategies
6 and are thus
likely to expand in both scope and geographical reach. In addi-
tion, the product is highly addictive and there are no real alter-
natives, whether in the form of pharmaceutical nicotine or
alternative tobacco products, currently available and able to
compete with cigarettes.
This market failure gives cigarette companies immense pricing
power which in turn is exacerbated by tobacco tax policies, the
most effective tobacco control policy available.
6 Taxes make up
a large portion, and manufacturer’s revenue a small portion, of
the ﬁnal price consumers pay. As a result, small increments in
the manufacturer’s margin have negligible impact on demand
but equate to big increases in manufacturer revenue. This is
particularly true in countries which have high speciﬁc tax
levels. As normal competitive forces are absent, the resulting
oligopoly can raise prices seemingly at will, generating sustained
high proﬁts, signiﬁcantly higher than those earned on other
consumer staples.
7 As table 2 shows, the proﬁtability of Europe’s
two largest tobacco companies (measured using the EBITA
Margindthe ﬁrms’ earnings before interest, taxation and
amortisation expenses have been deducted as a proportion of its
total revenue) is signiﬁcantly greater than that of comparable
consumer staple companies. Currently, tobacco proﬁts are
approximately double those of most other companies and these
very high returns are predicted to continue into the future. Only
one ﬁrm, Diageo, comes close to matching the high proﬁtability
of the tobacco companies; Diageo stands out as being abnor-
mally proﬁtable in the beverages industry sector and may also
beneﬁt from market power, reportedly enjoying 50% of the UK
gin and 40% of the global vodka market.
8
These excess returns, through reinvestment in brand
marketing, then further raise the barriers to market entry. In
short, the immense proﬁts cigarette companies make from selling
a product that kills one in two of its users
9 is not because of some
breakthrough intellectual property or other typical marketplace
advantage. Rather, it is a classic example of market failure.
How increases in speciﬁc taxes can beneﬁt tobacco companies
Ironically, this situation has been made worse by government
cigarette excise policies in two main ways. First, in many
Table 1 Cigarette market shares (%) by global brand owner for the major cigarette markets*, 2008
Company Brazil Canada China Germany India Indonesia Italy Japan Russia UK USA
Philip Morris International Inc 9.7 21.3 0.1 36.2 12.1 22.6 52.9 24.4 25.4 6.3
British American Tobacco Plc 86.3 59.0 0.6 20.0 2.7 24.1 10.2 19.6 8.1
Japan Tobacco Group Plc 10.8 0.2 5.0 1.3 16.2 64.9 36.9 38.8 0.4
Imperial Tobacco Group Plc 25.6 2.9 9.2 43.9 4.0
China National Tobacco Corp 98
ITC Groupy 58.3
Golden Tobacco Ltd 10.9
VST Industries Ltd 9.2
Godfrey Phillips India Ltdz 0.4
Gudang Garam Tbk PT 28.3
Djarum PT 13.8
Bentoel Internasional Investama Tbk PT 5.9
Nojorono Tobacco Indonesia PT 5.5
Philip Morris USA Inc 48.4
Reynolds American Incy 26.5
Lorilard Inc 10.1
Liggett Vector Brands Inc 1.8
Socie ´te ´ Industrielle des Tabacs du Cameron SA 1.4
Donskoi Tabak OAO 3.7
Private label 9.9 1.7
Others 2.6 8.9 1.2 3.3 7.8 21.2 4 0.5 5.2 1.3 8.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
No. of companies with market share >1 0 % 13 13 33 33 3 23
No. of companies with market share >2 5 % 11 12 11 11 2 22
Three-ﬁrm concentration ratio (cumulative share of
market of three biggest companies by market share)
97.4 91.1 98.8 81.8 81.3 64.7 93.2 99.5 81.9 90.8 85
Euromonitor from trade sources/national statistics. Data obtained: 23 September 2009.
Note: Where companies other than those listed have a market share of 1% or less, their share has been added to the ‘Others’ category.
*Data given for the world’s largest cigarette markets (China, Russia, US, Japan, Indonesia, Ukraine, Brazil, India), plus the two largest European markets (Italy and Germany) and the UK.
yPart owned by British American Tobacco.
zPart owned by Philip Morris International.
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Special communicationmarkets, particularly high tax markets where speciﬁc taxes
predominate, cigarette companies are using tax rises to disguise
price increases. This raises an issue, as reported in recent years by
city analysts, that small, gradual tax increases, even at high rates
of tax, may beneﬁt the industry (in contrast to large intermit-
tent tax increases) while having relatively little impact on
consumption.
7 10 11 Some even suggest that the major trans-
nationals now support higher speciﬁc taxes, albeit implemented
gradually.
12 As a result, high tax countries such as the UK, for
example, are now often the industry’s most proﬁtable.
11 It also
partly explains why industry proﬁts are increasing in most
western markets despite declining cigarette sales.
13 Second, this
emphasis on speciﬁc taxes has further reduced competition in
the market. Speciﬁc taxes tend to reduce price differentials while
ad valorem taxes widen them making it harder for cheap brands
to remain competitive (box 1). Speciﬁc taxes therefore tend to
favour the major tobacco companies (which sell predominantly
expensive cigarette brands or have a wide brand folio covering all
price segments) over smaller companies mainly selling cheaper
brands, and have probably contributed to the former’s growing
predominance.
This situation beneﬁts the tobacco industry while disadvan-
taging the consumer, and reducing potential beneﬁts to popu-
lation health and the public purse. The extreme proﬁtability of
cigarettes gives tobacco companies both the incentive and the
resources to ﬁght public health measures designed to reduce
tobacco consumption, and an enormous interest in opposing
anything that could disrupt the current cigarette-dominated
nicotine market. The pricing power of these companies also
creates signiﬁcant economic rents for the tobacco companies
which ought to be captured by the state and used for wider
social beneﬁts.
CHANGE IS NEEDED: WHAT ARE THE OPTIONS?
There are three main approaches through which this particular
market failure and related problems can be addressed, and any
organisation charged with preventing market abuses would wish
to consider each. First, creating more competition in the market;
second, nationalising tobacco companies; and, third, regulating
to overcome the negative consequences of market failure. The
ﬁrst would be both undesirable (as increased competition in the
cigarette market would have negative public health conse-
quences) and largely impossible given the existing barriers to
market entry, which, as outlined above, will increase as tobacco
control measures progress. Thus attempts to dismantle domi-
nant cigarette companies or encourage new entrants to the
cigarette market would almost certainly fail. The only way
in which competition could potentially be increased is if
a broader market in nicotine products could be created wherein
smokeless tobacco and other nicotine products could compete
with cigarettes. This too might raise public health concerns and,
even if it were achievable, competition would be severely limited
because the major cigarette manufacturers have now acquired
virtually all the large independent smokeless tobacco manufac-
turers,
15 and at least some, recognising cigarettes as their most
proﬁtable product, lack incentive to promote smokeless tobacco
to compete with cigarettes while having every incentive to
promote dual use in a way that maintains the cigarette market.
Nationalisation of transnational companies would capture the
excess rent accruing to the industry for governments, but would
be impractical, given the large revenues governments would
need to buy out the companies, the difﬁculty of engendering
public support and, in the case of transnational corporations, the
complex legal challenges. Closely related proposals to remove
the proﬁt incentive from tobacco manufacturing by buying out
the tobacco companies and transferring the assets to a not-for-
proﬁt organisation with a public health mandate would face
similar problems.
Regulation to overcome the problems of market failure,
therefore, seems a more attractive and practical proposal, and we
propose below a system of price cap regulation. However, we
ﬁrst note that implementation of sufﬁcient tobacco control
regulations, with plain packaging being a key example,
16 17
might also limit proﬁtability. The impact of such policies on
proﬁts would, however, be far less certain than price cap regu-
lation, particularly given the industry’s well-documented
history of circumventing previous advertising restrictions,
18e20
and less immediate. Nor would other regulations raise money for
the treasury. The key issue, however, is that one would not
preclude the other: price cap regulation would make it easier to
implement other tobacco control policies such as plain pack-
aging because arguments about their negative impact on
industry revenue would no longer apply and if such policies did
adequately address the excess returns, then price regulation
could stop.
A PROPOSAL FOR CHANGE: PRICE CAP REGULATION
We propose that the problems outlined above can be most easily
addressed by the application of a system of price cap regulation,
such as RPI-X,
21 22 to tobacco products wherein the cap is
applied to the manufacturers’ pre-tax price but not the retail
price. The rationale would be threefold. First, to help address the
market failure described above and control the excessive margins
enjoyed by the industry (without having to weaken essential
tobacco control policies). Second, to increase government
revenue by restricting the price the industry can charge, thus
enabling governments to increase taxes and transferring rent
from the tobacco industry to the government. Third, to bring
public health beneﬁts though a number of means outlined
further in the next section.
To our knowledge only one previous (unsuccessful) proposal
has been made to regulate manufacturers’ prices, in British
Columbia, Canada, in 1998.
23 Rules on minimum retail prices
Table 2 Proﬁtability (measured using the EBITA margin (%)) for
Europe’s two major tobacco companies and comparator European
consumer staple companies
Company 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008* 2009* 2010* 2011*
Tobacco companies
British American Tobacco 24.0 28.1 28.7 30.0 30.7 31.1 32.1 33.7
Imperial Tobacco Group 40.2 41.5 42.9 45.0 28.2 37.7 39.4 39.5
Food companies
Cadbury 15.6 15.9 14.4 13.5 12.0 13.0 13.8 14.9
Danone 12.7 13.1 13.3 12.1 14.4 16.9 15.7 15.9
Nestle 12.7 12.9 13.5 14.0 14.3 14.4 13.0 13.2
Premier Foods 12.9 13.7 13.8 12.5 11.9 12.0 11.9 11.7
Consumer products companies
Unilever NV 15.5 14.8 14.3 14.5 14.6 14.7 14.9 15.1
Henkel 9.4 9.7 10.2 10.5 10.3 9.0 10.6 11.6
L’Oreal 15.3 15.6 16.4 16.6 15.5 14.3 14.9 15.5
Reckitt Benckiser 19.3 20.1 21.5 22.6 23.4 23.9 23.2 23.6
Beverage companies
Heineken NV 13.6 13.1 13.0 14.8 13.2 13.5 14.0 14.4
SABMiller 18.1 20.2 16.9 16.8 16.6 16.8 17.3 18.5
Carlsberg 8.8 8.7 9.6 11.5 13.2 16.0 16.3 17.1
Diageo 28.7 29.0 28.2 28.3 28.5 28.9 31.5 31.8
Various Citigroup ‘Consumer Central’ business analyst investment reports.
*Estimated values
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Special communicationare more widely known
24 but differ signiﬁcantly by focusing on
retail rather than manufacturers’ prices and fail to deal with the
market failure and proﬁt issue. Furthermore, a new (albeit
contested) ruling suggests that minimum prices, in some
instances at least, may be illegal under EU law.
25
PRICE CAP REGULATION: THE BASIC MODEL AND ITS
APPLICATION IN THE UK
Price cap regulation has been heavily utilised in the British
utilities sector (and elsewhere) as a means of protecting society
from the monopoly power of companies which face little or no
competition given the nature of the market in question.
21 22 As
such, there are signiﬁcant parallels to the tobacco industry
where a strong case exists for further action to protect society
from the effects of market failure. As this market failure applies
to cigarette manufacturers rather than retailers, we envisage the
system only applying to those manufacturing (rather than
retailing) cigarettes for the UK market.
The system works by establishing an independent regulatory
agencydThe Ofﬁce for Smoked Tobacco Regulation
(OFSMOKE), for exampledwhich would carry out periodic
reviews of what cigarette companies are allowed to charge,
setting maximum prices allowed for each product. The prices set
would be based on how prices in the economy have generally
changed (the retail price index (RPI) element), an assessment of
the genuine costs each ﬁrm faces in its production and opera-
tions and an assumption about the productivity improvements
it would be expected to make (the X element).
For the sake of simplicity, we can illustrate this solution by
imagining how the system might work in practice. Let us
assume that after some research on the industry’s current costs
the regulator sets the maximum price a manufacturer can
charge, before any taxes or retailer’s margin are added. This
manufacturer’s price would undoubtedly be less than the
industry would wish to charge, thus curtailing proﬁts. How
much less would be judged by the regulator based upon its
assessment of the legitimate costs the industry faces. This is
illustrated in table 3 using a hypothetical example: the regulator
caps the manufacturer’s price at 50 pence per pack of 20 ciga-
rettes, a 40 pence reduction from the baseline situation. The
retailers would then add their mark-up as at present such that
their proﬁts would therefore be unaffected and the government
also adds its various taxes and duties. When implementing
a policy of RPI-X type price controls, government would need to
use tax policy to ensure that the ﬁnal price the consumer pays
does not fall. Again this is illustrated in table 3, where the
Table 3 Hypothetical example of RPI-X regulation as applied to a pack
of 20 cigarettes in the UK market (prices in pounds sterling (£))
Current
situation RPI-X
RPI-X plus government
response (ie, tax increase)
Taxes* 4.2 4.2 4.6
Retailer takey 0.4 0.4 0.4
Manufacturers takey 0.9 0.5 0.5
Retail price 5.5 5.1 5.5
*Includes tobacco excise tax and VAT (sales tax).
yIncludes costs and proﬁt.
Box 1 Ad valorem and speciﬁc taxes
Source: Adapted from Gilmore et al.
14 Note: Many countries, including the countries of the
European Union, have a mix of speciﬁc and ad valorem taxes.
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reduction in retail price unless the government increases taxes
accordingly. This 40 pence per pack currently accruing to
tobacco companies as a result of a market failure would thereby
be transferred to the national treasury.
The regulator would also have to consider whether this
regulated price should change during each of the years of the
price control period (usually between 3 and 5 years). Any
permitted changes would be based upon predicted changes in
average prices in the economy, predicted changes in industry
costs and efﬁciency savings the regulator feels the company can
make. For example, if average prices were seen to increase by 3%
per year, and companies were judged able to operate more efﬁ-
ciently (ie, by removing unnecessary spending while achieving
the same outputs) to the tune of 1% per year, the regulator
would allow the 50 pence to increase by 2% in each of the
subsequent years of the price control period.
Furthermore, when the regulator considers its next periodic
price review, it would act as above, but would also consider
what happened in the past control period. If some companies
had been able to generate efﬁciency savings of more than the 1%
assumed, then these additional savings could be taken into
account when setting the next price controls. Thus any efﬁ-
ciency gains in production are ultimately gained by society, since
beneﬁts to the company are limited to one price control period.
Similarly, changes in the price of key inputs, for example, or
changes in the marketplace can also be taken into consideration,
and it is this periodic ﬂexibility to look forwards as well as
backwards which ensures that neither the industry nor society is
stuck with an unsatisfactory situation.
Within the system described above, individual companies or
brands operating within the market may be allocated different
prices depending on the costs of inputs and manufacturing, but
given that most cost differences reﬂect packaging and marketing
spend, differences would probably be marginal.
The regulated companies still have an incentive to run their
operations efﬁciently since it is the price they can charge that is
regulated, not the proﬁts they can make. Thus by avoiding
unnecessary costs, the ﬁrms can boost the proﬁts that accrue to
shareholders in the short term. In contrast to the current situ-
ation, they cannot use price increases as a means of boosting
revenue.
OTHER POTENTIAL BENEFITS
There are also major public health beneﬁts of introducing RPI-X
type price regulation. It would remove the possibility of previ-
ously documented collusive price ﬁxing,
26e29 since prices would
now be set by the regulator rather than by the ﬁrms themselves.
It could also limit the use of price as a marketing tool,
30 since
differences between companies/brands would simply be based
on genuine costs of production rather than attempts to segment
the market through price. By signiﬁcantly reducing price differ-
entials, it would prevent down-trading to cheaper brands,
a trend which has increased in numerous markets in recent
years.
31e33 Moreover, if prices and taxes were applied to hand-
rolled and other smoked tobacco products in a similar way as to
cigarettes, as they should be, regulation could also be used to
prevent down-trading to hand-rolled products.
33 34
In order to set the price caps OFSMOKE would inevitably need
to closelymonitor theindustry,andthiscould helphighlight, and
ultimatelyeliminate,otherpracticesincludingyouthmarketing
35
and cigarette smuggling.
36 For example, if, despite marketing
restrictions, companies continued to actively and inappropriately
promote their products to youth, then promotional budgets
could be given limited allowances during the price review process
by identifying these activities as targets for the efﬁciency savings.
This would have the added beneﬁt of requiring companies to
disclose their promotional activities as currently required in
Canada, for example.
37 Even if marketing spend was not speciﬁ-
cally targeted in this way, the system would indirectly limit the
industry’s marketing budget by removing its ability to re-use its
efﬁciency savings, which for some companies have been
substantial in recent years.
38 The system of regulation could also
be structured to help address the problem of tobacco smuggling.
For instance, the price controls established would be based solely
upon legal sales, which would give the manufacturers a direct
incentive to help combat smuggling since the production costs of
illicit sales would be ineligible to be counted as a legitimate
expense, and any revenue gained from smuggled products would
be more readily identiﬁed. Furthermore, we might even imagine
aregimethatincludespenaltiestriggeredbysmugglingrates:high
smuggling and black market sales would result in lower future
prices for legitimate sales by way of a penalty for undesirable
actions (or the lack of desirable actions).
The scope of regulation is also potentially ﬂexible. Govern-
ments could set the scope of price regulation fairly narrowly on
cigarettes and other smoked tobacco products or, should the
policy of harm reduction ﬁnd favour, more broadly on all
tobacco products, or all nicotine products including pharma-
ceuticals. Thus governments could use the system to help direct
changes it desires.
While a narrow focus on price regulation could have the
advantage of reducing the likelihood of regulatory capture by the
industry, since such regulation is relatively straightforward and
has a documented record of success in other areas, the regulatory
remit could, over time, be expanded beyond price. This could
occur in a number of directions to address, for example, product
content, marketing, distribution, access and underage sales that
the manufacturer and retailer, in varying degrees, could be held
responsible for. Such increased remit would bring the system in
line with proposals for more comprehensive tobacco market
regulation that have previously been made
39 and might have
a number of advantages. First, it might allow for greater inte-
gration and consistency in tobacco policy. Second, by addressing
price, access to and promotion of all nicotine products within
one regulatory system, it could help address the current imbal-
ance in the nicotine market in which the most harmful nicotine
delivery products (cigarettes) are the most accessible and the
least harmful (pharmaceutical products) the least accessible.
40 41
The issue of underage sales is somewhat more complex as both
the manufacturer and the retailer could be held responsible, but
could also be addressed, at least in theory, if, for example,
companies were held ineligible to proﬁt from underage tobacco
sales.
The most obvious beneﬁt of RPI-X regulation, however, is the
direct reduction in the tobacco industry’s proﬁt, because this
will directly reduce the incentive and ability of tobacco
companies to ﬁght public health measures. Not only will the
companies have fewer funds available to do this, but the
industry would also be partially insulated against tobacco
control measures and less able to argue that they would have
negative economic impacts. When setting future price controls,
OFSMOKE would take into account past and likely future
changes to tobacco policy and if this included public health
measures which would directly affect the industry, it would
need to reﬂect the new constraints in the regulated prices the
industry would be allowed to charge. Thus by removing some of
the potential adverse affects on industry proﬁtability, the system
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effective public health policy and would be a more practical
means of doing so than previous proposals.
PRACTICALITIES AND POTENTIAL POLICY CHALLENGES
As with any signiﬁcant change in policy, a number of issues
would have to be considered when developing the regulatory
system. The main and a potentially signiﬁcant barrier would be
reluctance to establish a regulatory agency. The issue of cost is,
however, easily overcome because, as with other similar
agencies, OFSMOKE could be funded through a levy or licence
fee paid by all the tobacco companies operating in the market,
and need not therefore cost the consumer or taxpayer directly.
Consequently, it should be reasonably easy to sell the policy to
consumers who are ultimately the voters behind the politicians
who would have to implement such a scheme. Public mistrust of
the tobacco industry is widely held even among smokers
42 and
thus a measure to control the oligopoly power of tobacco ﬁrms,
given all the aforementioned beneﬁts, should enjoy wide public
support.
There are likely to be some, most notably the tobacco
industry, who suggest that the imposition of this type of direct
economic regulation is an extreme reaction. It is hard, however,
to argue that nothing needs to be done given the extent of the
market power and the number of deaths the sector causes.
Moreover, potential alternatives, as outlined above, appear to be
less practical or unlikely to address the market failure which will
only be ampliﬁed by further tobacco control measures.
Furthermore, the imposition of RPI-X regulation is in line with
the UK Better Regulation Executive’s ﬁve principles of sound
regulation (box 2), thus eliminating a likely line of industry
argument.
43
A further consideration is whether the tobacco industry or
retailer would undermine price controls by switching to a low
price strategy. While theoretically possible, both are unlikely. As
the proposal would not alter proﬁt margins for the retailer, there
is no reason for them to change their current pricing behaviour.
For the manufacturer, price controls would probably be set low
enough to only allow a return that just covers the cost of
industry capital. Thus cutting prices would severely restrict
proﬁt per unit. Other tobacco control measures, combined with
the inelasticity of demand, would mean that manufacturers and
retailers are most unlikely to be able to increase sales sufﬁciently
to offset the reduction in revenue per pack that would result,
suggesting this would not be a sensible strategy. Furthermore,
even if they were to attempt to cut prices, the government could
respond by further increasing taxes to ensure the price the
consumer faces does not fall.
Finally, some might suggest that the increased government
revenue might reduce government incentives to implement
effective tobacco control measures. While theoretically an issue,
it is possible, given the price inelasticity of tobacco, that just as
industry proﬁts are increasing despite falling sales, government
revenue might follow the same pattern. Even if this was not the
case (and this would require further research), any perverse
incentives would be mitigated by two aspects of price cap
regulation. First, the industry would now have far less incentive
to lobby heavily against tobacco control measures as outlined
above. Second, the regulatory agency would help distance and
shield government from the tobacco industry, as the regulator
would now be responsible for determining the impact of tax and
tobacco control policies on the industry.
Importantly, most governments have extensive experience in
undertaking these sorts of activities and the fact that price cap
regulation is used in other sectors provides sufﬁcient evidence of
its feasibility and legality under both World Trade Organization
and European Union rules. Although a detailed review of these
issues is outside the remit of this initial exploratory paper, we
note that the cap would apply equally to domestic and imported
products (and thus be compliant with Article III of the Global
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)), and as the system
would allow reasonable proﬁts (being intended to capture excess
proﬁts, not cut salesdthe latter being addressed separately
through excise policy), it could not be considered a ‘quantitative
restriction’ (Article XI of GATT).
THE POTENTIAL FOR BROAD APPLICATION
We believe the system proposed could be applied to most
markets and, given the consolidation in the tobacco industry in
recent years and the highly concentrated market shares seen
globally (table 1),
3 is increasingly likely to be needed. There are
also no reasons why such a scheme is not suitable for markets
dominated by state-owned companies. Regulation of a domi-
nant state run ﬁrm might seem difﬁcult if, for example, the
government in question relies upon it for revenue. However, as
established above, regulation of industry prices gives greater
scope for direct taxation of tobacco products, so any reduction in
the dividends to the government could be offset through the
greater scope that they gain in tax policy. Furthermore, there are
precedents for dominant government-owned companies being
made subject to independent RPI-X regulation, with the Royal
Mail in the UK being an example. The key is that the regulation
of prices is conducted by an independent regulator acting in the
wider public interest, rather than the government making
decisions in light of its political position. Moreover, as explored
above, there is ﬂexibility in how the system could be applied and
it could therefore be carefully adapted to the national context.
MOVING FORWARD
Clearly such a proposal moves both tobacco pricing and regu-
lation beyond its traditional boundaries and further work would
be needed to examine in detail how such a scheme might be
established. There is, however, a substantial literature and much
documented success of adopting RPI-X regulation
21 22 and we
therefore believe this is a realistic and attractive policy option.
This paper demonstrates the strong case for regulation, that the
system can be simply applied at no cost to the taxpayer and
would bring numerous potential health and ﬁscal beneﬁts. We
recognise that any new proposal is likely to meet with initial
Box 2 The principles of sound regulation and how they are
met
Five principles for sound regulation are advocated by the UK
Better Regulation Executive. The proposed system would meet
these because:
< It is proportionate to the problem at hand
< The regulator would be accountable for its actions
< It is consistent with wider government policy towards the
tobacco industry
< It is transparent as RPI-X is a well-known system with
industry consultation and the right to appeal
< It is clearly targeted at the cause of the problem
Source: http://www.berr.gov.uk/whatwedo/bre/index.html
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Special communicationresistance, but hope that, if nothing else, this paper will have
stimulated debate about anomalies in the current cigarette
market that urgently need addressing.
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